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Negative correlation between retirement age 
and contribution length?
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Abstract
Though never stated explicitly, there is a hidden hypothesis that in a normal pension system,
the retirement age and the contribution length are strongly  and positively correlated.  We
compare the time paths  of  male  and female  correlation  coefficients  in  Austria,  Hungary,
Germany and Sweden for several years and categories; and obtain a mixed picture. Hungary
stands out with its strong negative correlation but the remaining three countries cannot boast
with  strongly  positive  correlation,  either.  Further  work  is  needed  to  understand  the
significance  of  our  findings  but  they  signal  some  problems  with  these  systems:
heterogeneously fragmented careers and unfair benefit rules. 
Keywords: public pension system, length of employment, fragmented careers, retirement
age
JEL classification: H55, J26, J64
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Negatív korreláció a nyugdíjba vonulási kor 
és a szolgálati idő között?
Erik Granseth – Wolfgang Keck – Wolfgang Nagl – 
Simonovits András – Tir Melinda
Összefoglaló
Bár  soha  sem  mondták  ki  explicite,  mégis  létezik  egy  rejtett  hipotézis:  normális
nyugdíjrendszerekben a nyugdíjba vonulási kor és a szolgálati idő hossza erősen és pozitívan
korrelál.  Ebben a  dolgozatban  összehasonlítjuk  az  osztrák,  a  magyar,  a  német  és  a  svéd
mutatókat  férfiakra és  nőkre,  több évre  és  kategóriára  lebontva,  és  vegyes képet  kapunk.
Magyarország  kiválik  erősen  negatív  korrelációjával,  de  a  másik  három  ország  sem
dicsekedhet  erős  pozitív  korrelációval.  További  munkára  van  szükség,  hogy  megértsük
megfigyeléseink jelentőségét, de annyit már most elmondhatunk, hogy problémákra utalnak:
heterogén töredezettségű munkaviszonyra és méltánytalan járadékokra 
Tárgyszavak:  tb-nyugdíjrendszer,  szolgálati  idő,  töredezett  munkaviszony,  nyugdíjba
vonulási kor
JEL kódok: H55, J26, J64
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In aging populations, the proportional rise of the average (or effective) retirement age is a key
requirement of any pension system. There is a vast literature concerning the impact of the
retirement rules on the retirement age (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986; Stock and Wise,
1990  and Gruber  and Wise,  eds.  2007).  In  well-designed pensions  systems,  the  pension
benefit is an increasing function of the retirement age and of the lifetime contribution in a
wide interval of these two variables. Since we shall not consider wages, therefore the average
lifetime contribution will  be replaced by the  contribution length.1  In the simplest setting
(neglecting growth and interest), the so-called actuarially fair pension benefit is proportional
to the length of contributions and inversely proportional to the remaining life expectancy,
which in turn is an almost linear decreasing function of the retirement age in the relevant
interval.2 
Though never stated explicitly,  there is  a hidden hypothesis that in a normal pension
system,  the  retirement  age  and  the  contribution  length  are  strongly  and  positively
correlated. In  fact,  a  hidden  but  invalid  assumption  lies  behind  the  hypothesis  on
correlation:  the employment career is  generally  continuous (non-fragmented).  If  a  typical
employment  were continuous,  then the contribution length would simply be equal  to the
retirement age less the age starting to work, say 20 years.3 Then delaying retirement by one
year  would  increase  the  employment  length  by  one  year.  Furthermore,  if  the  degree  of
fragmentation were positive but uniform, the correlation coefficient would remain the same,
close to +1. 
But in countries in transition in general and in Hungary in particular, a large share of
workers has fragmented employment careers, while others still have continuous careers (e.g.
Augusztinovics and Köllő, 2008 and 2009). Similarly heterogeneous fragmentation can be
observed in  mature  market  economies  (e.g.  Chan and Stevens,  2004;  Etgeton,  2016 and
Manoli and Weber, 2016). Therefore the above deduction on the strongly positive correlation
coefficient is not valid.
In an Appendix we present two simple pension models. In Model 1, with rigidly defined
retirement age, the corresponding correlation is negative. In Model 2, with flexible (variable)
retirement  age,  the  correlation  is  positive.  Without  going  into  the  details  of  a  country’s
1  We shall use alternatively also length of employment/contribution or years of contributions.  
2  Another definition of fairness: the social security wealth is invariant to the retirement age.
3   The common starting point is a good approximation for some countries, like Hungary, where the
years of higher education (at least obtained before 1998) count as years of contribution.
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pension  system,  we  conjecture  that  the  less  rigid  the  system,  or  equivalently,  the  more
flexible the retirement age, the higher the algebraic value of the correlation coefficient. 
Having  analyzed  the  gainers  and  losers  of  the  Hungarian  retirement  rules,  Czeglédi,
Simonovits, Szabó and Tir (2016) observed time-varying but strongly negative correlation
coefficients, especially for females. For example, the existence of peculiar pension rules (like
seniority  pensions)  and  uncertainty  concerning  pension  policy  may  imply  a  paradoxical
behavior: the longer the employment length, the earlier one retires. 
Following this pilot study on the Hungarian correlation coefficients, in the present paper
we make a limited international comparison for four countries to see their time development;
and try  to  make judgment  on the flexibility  of  the  foregoing  pension  system through its
correlation coefficient. Obviously, the results may depend on the sex of the group (females
have more fragmented careers and frequently retire earlier than males, coordinating their
decisions with their typically older husbands) and the width of the pensioner category (all or
old-age pensioners, contribution length is arbitrary or greater than a relatively high value,
etc.). As a rule, the signed correlation coefficients are almost always higher for males than for
females but their differences vary across countries.
Without going into details, note that each of the foregoing countries has had a dominant
public  pension system,  with a  relatively  high replacement  rate.4 The strength of  the  link
between lifetime contribution and lifetime benefits varied across time and space, but they
were definitely positive. We have obtained the following empirical results.
1. (a) Between 2003 and 2010, in Hungary, for those retiring above age 54, the correlation
coefficient was at most –0.3 and sometimes reaching –0.7. (b) By requiring minimum 20
years  of employment,  the correlation rose a little  bit  but not much. (c)  Finally,  confining
attention to those retiring at normal retirement age, the correlation coefficient was always
higher than –0.3 and frequently close to 0.
2. The situation in Austria has been somewhat different. (a) Unrestricted male and female
correlation coefficients oscillated between 0.1 and –0.5, respectively. (b) Requiring 20 years
of employment slightly lifts the correlations. (c) Confining attention to old-age retirement,
both  correlation  coefficients  are  even  lower,  and  oscillate  between  –0.5  and  –0.7,
respectively.  
(d) Requesting at least 20 years and old-age retirement, the coefficients slightly rose but not
much.
3.  Turning to Germany,  (a)  requesting a minimum length of 15 years,  the correlation
coefficients oscillated between –0.8 and –0.2, sometimes the female indicator being higher
4  Rather high in Austria and Hungary, not so high in Germany and Sweden, but still much higher
than in the public pillar of the UK and the US.
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than its male counterpart. (b) Requiring at least 35 years of contributions (to be called critical
length), the coefficients rose close to 0: for males, a little bit above 0, for females starting with
negative, and continuing with positive values. 
4. Last but not least, the Swedish system seems to be the fairest. (a) In the unrestricted
version, both correlation coefficients were close to each other and to 0. (b) Requiring at least
30 years of service, the coefficients were higher but close to 0. (c) Sorting out those who have
less than 30 contributive years, we obtain a declining curve, reaching –0.3 for females in
2015.
In summary, Hungary stands out with its strong negative correlation but the remaining
three  countries  cannot  boast  with  strongly  positive  correlation,  either.  Further  work  is
needed to understand the significance of our findings but they signal some problems with
these pension systems. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the framework. Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 present the country studies for Hungary, Austria, Germany and Sweden, respectively.
Section 7 concludes. The paper closes with a theoretical Appendix.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Before  presenting  the  country  studies,  it  is  worth  constructing  an  analytical  framework.
Consider a country with a cohort born in year t. (In fact, in most countries, one should also
distinguish females  and males.)  Index the cohort  members with  i  =1,  2,…,  n, denote  the
retirement age, the corresponding contribution length, and lifetime gross wage by Ri , Si and
wi, respectively. Obviously, the annual benefit bi depends on Ri, Si  and wi  : bi =b(Ri , Si,  wi),
typically increasing in all the three variables. We call a system flexible if the elasticities of the
benefit to the three variables are positive and far from being zero in a large feasibility domain
(e.g. S ≥ 20 and R > 60). In contrast, we call a system lenient if the second elasticity is zero
for long enough contribution period (say 35-40 years); and rigid if the benefit is not defined
in the subdomain of the feasibility domain (S <40 and  R < 63). In a lot of countries, the
normal  (statutory)  retirement  age  (R*)  and  the  critical  contribution  length  (So)  play  an
additional role; (a) in a flexible (variable) system, retiring before/after reaching R* implies a
deduction/credit and (b) if a worker has a contribution length of at least So, she is entitled to
early retirement without deduction.
The  standard  theoretical  literature  typically  assumes  a  simple  relation  between  the
retirement age  Ri and the contribution length  Si, e.g.  Si =  Ri –  L. Note, however, the basic
insight of the relevant literature (e.g. Czeglédi et al., 2016) that there is no such a relation. As
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a first approximation,  we may assume that a worker considers  her/his retirement age  Ri,
knowing that her/his length of employment is determined by Si = Φi (Ri), where Φi (∙) is an
increasing function, i=1, 2,…, n. In the simplest case, this function is affine: Si = φi (Ri – L),
where  1–φi is  the degree  of  fragmentation of  employee  i’s  career.  Understanding  this
connection and the benefit function b(R, S, w), the employee chooses her/his retirement age.
To define the correlation coefficient  between the retirement  age and the contribution
length,  we  need  the  expected  retirement  age  and  the  expected  employment  length,
respectively:
ER =(1/n)∑i Ri  and  ES =(1/n)∑i Si  
and their variances: 
D2R = E(R – ER)2   and  D2S = E(S – ES)2.
Finally we define the correlation coefficient between R and S:
ρ(R, S) = E((R – ER) (S – ES))/(DR DS)   if   DR > 0   and  DS > 0.
As is known, –1 ≤ ρ(R, S) ≤ 1, and the equalities hold if and only if S = AR +B, with A < 0
and A > 0, respectively. Note that if all the degrees of fragmentation φ is were close to each
other, then ρ(R, S) ≈ 1 but this is not the case. 
At the end of the Section, we repeat our starting hypothesis: the more flexible the pension
system, the greater the algebraic value of the correlation coefficient. In our Appendix, we
shall consider two extreme examples and illustrate this hypothesis numerically.
3. CORRELATIONS IN HUNGARY
Apart from an aborted trial to carve out a second, mandatory funded private pillar from the
Hungarian  public  pension  system  between  1998  and  2010  (see,  Simonovits,  2011),  the
Hungarian mandatory pension system has been basically unfunded. The progressivity has
practically been phased-out. Between 2003 and 2010 (and also later), the retirement rules
frequently changed in Hungary (cf. Czeglédi et al., 2016 and Freudenberg, Berki and Reiff,
2016).  Most  notably,  the  female  normal  retirement  age  (at  which  workers  could  retire
without any limitation) was raised from 55 (in 1995) to 59 in 2003, 60 in 2005, 61 in 2007
and 62 in 2009. Male’s normal retirement age was already 62 in 2001. One may find the
unified normal retirement age low but it is already 63 and will reach 65 by 2022.Any rise in
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the normal retirement age is  only meaningful  if  it  punishes those who retire below it.  In
principle, this was the case, but in practice, there were a lot of transient rules which almost
eliminated the deduction for early retirement, at least until 2010.
The following three figures show that, at least in Hungary, between 2003 and 2010, the
foregoing correlation was negative, sometimes very strongly negative. (For the data used, see
Czeglédi et al., 2016). The reason may be simple: those who acquired the critical contribution
period, retired immediately without any deduction; the others had to work until  reaching
normal retirement age. 
Figure 3.1 concerns all workers who retired above 54. For them, the foregoing correlation
was only –0.3 in 2003, but it dropped to –0.45 by 2007. For females, the situation is even
more paradox: the indicator started from –0.4 and dropped to –0.7 by 2010. The local female
minima at odd years were caused by the rise in the normal retirement age by one year in
these years.
Figure 3.1. 
Correlation coefficient for those retiring above 54, 
between 2003 and 2010, Hungary
0
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-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
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males females
Source: Czeglédi et al. (2016)
To  exclude  outliers,  we  confine  our  attention  to  those  who  had  at  least  20  years  of
employment  (the recent minimum value).  Similarly  to Figure 3.1,  Figure  3.2 also reports
negative and time-decreasing correlation.
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Figure 3.2. 
Correlation coefficient for those retiring above 54, with minimum 
20 years of employment, between 2003 and 2010, Hungary
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Source: Czeglédi et al. (2016)
Further  delimiting  the  analysis,  we  only  consider  those  who  retired  at  or  above  the
normal  retirement age.  Figure 3.3 still  reports negative correlation but with low absolute
values.
Figure 3.3. 
Correlation coefficient for those retiring at or above the normal retirement age, 
between 2003 and 2010, Hungary
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Source: Czeglédi et al. (2016)
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4. CORRELATIONS IN AUSTRIA
The public pension system (the dominant pillar) in Austria is a defined benefit pay-as-you-go
scheme (cf.  Manoli and Weber, 2016). Since the General Pension Act of 2004, to calculate
pension benefits the complete employment history is to be taken into account. Before this
reform the replacement rate increased with the years of employment but only the 15 years
with  the  highest  income  were  taken  into  account  to  calculate  the  monthly  pension.  For
entitlements before 2004, grandfathering applies, so there is a long transition period before
the new system fully applies. Note that today’s retirees are not or only a little affected by the
new system.  The normal  (statutory)  retirement  age is  currently  65 for  males  and 60 for
females, but the latter will increase up to 65 between the years 
Until  2017  it  is  still  possible  to  retire  before  the  statutory  retirement  age  without
deductions if the individual contribution period is long enough (35 years) and in the past this
was an often used pathway into retirement, especially by males.  There are mainly three ways
to choose early retirement with deduction: early retirement due to a long insurance history,
pension due to hard labor and a corridor pension. For all  three forms of early retirement
different but long insurance periods are required.5 People who are not able to work anymore
are covered via invalidity pensions. Up to 2014 it was part of the public pension system, now
it is part of the health insurance system. 
Using the IHS Microsimulation  Model  for Retirement  Behavior  in Austria  (IREA) we
calculate correlations between the retirement age and the individual contribution period.6 To
ensure complete insurance histories in IREA, two very detailed micro datasets are merged:
The Condensed Insurance Periods and Pension Calculation dataset7 and the Austrian Labour
Market Database.8 Since 1972 the AMDB has provided a total census of all employed persons
in Austria, but our primary source of information is the VVP. The VVP is a 50% sample of all
new retirees between the years 2001 and 2011 and contains all pension relevant information
(insurance periods, assessment base, individual pension entitlement, date of retirement etc.).
The overall correlations between the retirement age and the contribution length are quite
different for males and females in Austria. For all new male retirees over 54 between 2001
and 2011, the annual correlation was positive, for all female new retirees, it was negative (see
Figure 4.1). 
5  For detailed information see Federal Ministry of Finance (2012) and Hanappi et al. (2012).
6  For a detailed description of the IHS Microsimulation Model for Retirement Behavior in Austria
(IREA) see Hofer et al. (2012). 
7  Verdichteter Verlauf Pensionen, VVP
8  Arbeitsmarktdatenbank, (AMDB
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Figure 4.1. 
Correlation coefficient for males and females retiring above 54, Austria
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Source: VVP and AMDB 2001-2011.
The explanation is simple: males with more years of contribution retire later and females
with more years of contribution retire earlier. When we focus on people with at least 20 years
in employment the positive correlation for males becomes even more pronounced, whereas
the absolute value of the negative correlation for females is reduced (see Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2.
Correlation coefficients for retiring above 54, with minimum 20 years of
employment, Austria 
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Source: VVP and AMDB 2001-2011.
The strong gender difference is most probably driven by invalidity pensions. Excluding
disabled pensioners, the correlations for males and females are quite similar (see Figures 4.3
and 4.4). The negative correlation for old-age male and female retirees is what one would
most probably expect because there are, as mentioned above, a variety of pathways into early
retirement in Austria. For these pathways, it is mandatory to have long insurance periods.
13
The  lower  negative  correlation  for  females  might  occur  because  of  the  lower  statutory
retirement  age  for  females  in  Austria.  The  restriction  of  a  minimum  of  20  years  of
employment reduces negative correlation a little (see Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.3. 
Correlation coefficients for retiring above 54, only old age pension, Austria
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
-0.7
-0.8
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
males females
Source: VVP and AMDB 2001-2011
Figure 4.4. 
Correlation coefficient for retiring above 54, with minimum 20 years of
employment, only old age pensions, Austria
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Source: VVP and AMDB 2001-2011.
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5. CORRELATIONS IN GERMANY
In Germany the public pension system is the dominant pillar (cf. Werding, 2016). Contrary to
Hungary or Austria, the benefit has always been proportional to lifetime average earnings.
The minimum contribution length is equal to five years. The shortest contribution length to
early retirement scheme which is accessible to females and unemployed persons is equal to 15
years. If a person contributed for 35 years, a general access to an early retirement scheme is
provided.  Insurance  records  include  not  only  months  with  pension  contributions  due  to
employment, short-term unemployment, and care giving but also non-contributory periods
which  are  acknowledged  for  the  pension  calculation:  schooling  times,  long-term
unemployment, child-rearing, sickness etc. 
If the empirical test of the hypothesis should be more than a reflection of the accessibility
of  the early retirement schemes, the analyses have to be restricted to two subsamples of
retirees. The larger group formed by those retirees who have at least a contribution length of
15 years (98% of all retirees both for females and males). The smaller group formed by those
retirees  who  have  in  general  access  to  an  early  retirement  scheme  due  to  35  years  of
insurance records (75% of males and around 50% of females).9 
Reiterating, in the German pension system, the benefit amount has always been strongly
linked not only to the contribution length, but also to the retirement age and the lifetime
wage. Major pension reforms in Germany since 1992 have even tightened this relationship.
On the one hand, actuarial deductions have only been introduced between 1998 and 2004,
and reforms took effect in the two schemes with rather lenient eligibility criteria in terms of
the 15 years of contributions. Here the maximum deduction increased from zero to 18 percent
of  the  pension claim if  a  person retires  five years  before  the statutory  retirement  age.  A
second strand of the reform raised the minimum retirement age for the statutory pension age
as well as for the early retirement schemes. Earliest retirement age was increased from 60 to
63 years from 2005 to 2011 (except for severely disabled persons) and statutory retirement
age will increase from 65 in 2012 up to 67 in 2029. Finally the two early retirement schemes
with a short waiting period of 15 years of contribution were abolished for those born after
1952 which mean that from 2017 onwards these schemes will not exist anymore. 
A backlash to these dominant reforms in the last two decades happened in 2012 (and
again reformed in 2014) with a new early retirement scheme for very long insured persons
with  a  waiting  period  of  45  years.  Since  2014  this  scheme  has  been  allowing  an  early
retirement with the age of 63 without deductions for some birth cohorts.
9  Unfortunately, the data refer to the years of contributions rather than of employment. Thus there
is a different classification than the analyses from Austria and Hungary. However, in Germany, the
vast majority of contributions records are related to employment.
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Figure 5.1 shows the correlation between years of contributions and retirement age for all
new retirees having achieved a minimum of 15 years of contribution. The results are pretty
much a reflection of the pension reforms. Between 2000 and 2004 pension deduction were
introduced for early retirement and therefore the decisions on retirement depended at that
time to a substantial part in optimizing the pension benefit by using the (closing) windows of
opportunity.  The peak in 2007 for males may have something to do with a labor market
reform. Until 2007 unemployed persons could retire at the age of 60 if they have previously
been unemployed for at least 2 years. Since 2008 this option has been closed. Females are
not so much affected because they have still the opportunity to retire at the age of 60 in a
pension  scheme  accessible  for  them  only.  Between  2008  and  2013  in  particular  the
correlation  coefficient  for  females  and  males  converged  mainly  because  of  the  growing
restriction for early retirement for females. The break in 2014 has probably to do with the
reform of the early retirement scheme for very long insured persons.
Figure 5.1.
 Correlation coefficient for at least 15 years of contribution, Germany
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Source: Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (German Pension Insurance): 
Rentenzugang 2000-2015
The developments over time are smoother when considering only retirees with longer
insurance  periods  (Figure  5.2).  This  subsample  is  not  so  much  affected  by  the  ongoing
pension reforms. Pension deductions for the early retirement scheme for long-term insured
persons were already introduced in 1998. Of course, this group could make use of different
early retirement schemes, also those with more lenient eligibility conditions. But at the same
time there is an increasing share of individuals who continuously stay in the labor market in
later life, and who do not perceive job pressures to retire earlier.
16
Figure 5.2. 
Correlation coefficient with at least 35 years of insurance, Germany
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6. CORRELATIONS IN SWEDEN
The Swedish mandatory pension system has two pillars: the first pillar (the dominant) is an
unfunded public system, while the second pillar (subordinate) is a mandatory private funded
system (cf. Palmer, 2000 and Sundén, 2006), Sweden is still  in transition from a defined
benefit system (DB) to a notional defined contribution system (NDC, inkomstpension). In the
old  system,  30 years  of  contribution were needed for  full  qualification.  Because the new
pension system is a notional defined contribution (NDC) system, there is a direct linkage
between the number of contributing years (pension contribution), the retirement age and the
pension. If the pension level is beneath a certain threshold, there is a top-up to a minimum
level  by the guaranteed pension (garantipension)  and/or housing benefit.  In Sweden, the
minimal retirement age is 61. The guaranteed pension is only paid after the 65th birthday.
Figure 6.1 shows that there is almost no correlation between the retirement age and the
number of working years for the period between 2003 and 2013. Since 2013 there is a weak
negative correlation.  The reason for the drop is a selection effect. Cohorts 1949 and 1950
became 65 years old in 2014 and 2015, and if they were included, the correlation coefficient
for those years would be around zero for both sexes.10
10  One reason for why the correlation coefficient is close to zero is because a majority retires when
they are 65 years old. Cohorts 1949 and 1950 were excluded since only the early retirees would have
had time to retire in the period studied.
17
Figure 6.1. 
Correlation coefficient for those born 1938–1948, Sweden
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Figure 6.2. 
Correlation coefficient for those born 1938–1948 and 
at least 30 years of contribution, Sweden
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Figure 6.2 only includes retirees with 30 or more contributing years. There is almost no
correlation between the retirement age and the contribution length. There is a small increase
in the correlation coefficient over time. This can be explained by the fact that there is only
earnings data from 1960 and that the first cohorts can have years of contribution that we are
unaware of.
For those with fewer than 30 years of contribution, there is a negative correlation that is
decreasing over time between pension age and contributive years (Figure 6.3). This implies
that there is a tendency that those with few years of contribution have higher retirement age
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than those with more contribution years. Since the guaranteed pension is only paid from 65
years of age, persons with few contribution years wait until 65 before retiring. The old DB
system was also more lax concerning lifetime income. The 15 highest income years out of 30
were used for the pension level calculation; the phasing-out this rule might partly explain the
decrease of correlation over time.
Figure 6.3. 
Correlation coefficient for those born 1938–1948 and 
with less than 30 years of contribution, Sweden
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The correlation coefficient between retirement age and the number of contribution years
in Sweden has been around zero and its absolute value has been weaker than the Austria and
Hungary. This might be caused by the higher minimum retirement age and the emergence of
a  defined  contribution  system with  no  minimum  years  for  qualification.  It  is  also  quite
difficult to draw any general conclusions since the employees studied are in a transition from
a defined benefit system to a defined contribution system.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
We have compared the mandatory (mainly public) pension systems of four EU countries:
Hungary, Austria, Germany and Sweden from a single point of view: what was the value of
the correlation coefficient between retirement age and length of contribution between 2000–
2015 or in a long subinterval? In each country, the public pension pillar has been dominating,
though in Sweden the private pillar has also been playing an important role (OECD, 2016).
The correlation between the retirement age and the employment length varied from year to
year and country to country. Austria (still counting only a limited number of years’ earning to
define the lifetime reference wage, lower female than male normal retirement age  and with a
weak  deduction  for  early  retirement)  has  the  most  generous  system  in  offering  early
retirement  for workers with short and fragmented careers. On the other end, Germany and
Sweden with their point system and nonfinancial defined contribution system respectively
are close to copy a mandatory life-annuity scheme. Hungary (the only ex-communist country,
still  suffering  from  the  transitional  depression)  had  improved  the  incentives  to  delay
retirement until 2010, but since 2011, politically motivated rules (no deduction for females
with 40 years of employment and no early retirement for others) crept in.
Gender  differences  appear  predominantly  in  Hungary  and  Austria  where  males  and
females  have  had  different  opportunities  for  earlier  retirement.  In  Germany,  these
differences  are  diminishing over  time because the access  to  the specific  early  retirement
scheme for females has been impeded. In Sweden there seem to be no consistent gender
difference because there are not any specific early retirement regulations for females. 
Rather than studying the social optimality of these pension systems, we have used a very
simple and sturdy indicator for evaluation: the correlation coefficient between the retirement
age and the length of employment. If there were no fragmentation or the fragmentation were
quasi homogenous, then the correlation coefficient would be close to +1. With heterogeneous
workers  and  unnaturally  favoring  the  early  retirement  of  those  with  long  contribution
lengths, the correlation approaches –1. As was expected, positive correlation has appeared in
all the three mature market economies, but surprisingly, their values remained close to 0.
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APPENDIX.  
THE IMPACT OF THE RETIREMENT RULES ON THE CORRELATION
In this Appendix two simple models  are constructed, where the impact of the retirement
rules on the correlation coefficient between the retirement age and the contribution length
can be studied theoretically. Model 1 (rigid) produces a negative correlation, while Model 2
(flexible)  produces  a  positive  correlation.  In  fact,  rather  than  calculating  correlation
coefficients, we rely on Csebyshev’s algebraic inequality (cf. Simonovits, 1995 and Wagener,
1996) and prove that because the retirement age is an increasing (decreasing) function of the
degree of fragmentation in Model 1 (2), while the contribution length is a decreasing function
of it.
Our starting point is  that  there are groups in  the population  whose working carriers  are
differently  fragmented.  We  do  not  repeat  the  formulas  from  Section  2  but  change  their
content:  now the index  i refers to a group rather than an individual,  n is  the number of
groups rather than that of persons, therefore fi (> 0) be the population share of group i with
∑i fi =1. Correspondingly,
ER =∑i fi Ri  and  ES =∑i fi Si .
MODEL 1 (RIGID)
The simplest way to model a rigid retirement rule is the following.  For every worker, the
retirement period’s length D – R should be equal to a given share σ (<1) to the contribution
length S = φ(R – L), implying D – R = σ φ(R – L). Hence the φ-specific retirement age and
the corresponding contribution length are respectively equal to
1
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Here (R(φ), S(φ)) depend on the non-fragmentation rate φ; the retirement age is decreasing
in  φ  and  the  contribution  length  is  increasing  in  φ.  Obviously,  this  implies  a  negative
correlation.  Defining the gross  replacement  rate  (β)  by  b =  β  w,  the  equality  of  lifetime
contributions and benefits, τ φ(R – L) w = b (D–R) implies β = τ/σ.
Table A.1 displays these functions for three values of φ, setting σ=1/2,  L=20,  D = 80. As is
expected, the stronger the fragmentation, the higher the retirement age and the shorter is the
contribution length. 
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Table A.1
 Fragmentation, retirement age and contribution length
Non-fragmentation rate Retirement age (year) Contribution length (year)
  1.0   60.0  40.0 
  0.9   61.4  37.2  
  0.8   62.9  34.3  
Of course, this rule––insisting on equalizing the replacement rates for all workers––is very
rude but captures the thinking of those planners who punish workers of short employment
with late retirement. Due to the quasi-linearity of  R(φ) and  S(φ), their correlation is very
close –1.
MODEL 2 (FLEXIBLE)
In contrast, Model 2 is based on a standard optimization. Here our initial idea can be proved:
in  a  NDC  system,  the  more  fragmented  one’s  labor  career,  the  earlier  she  retires.  The
simplest formulation of NDC’ benefit is obtained by dividing lifetime contributions τ φ (R–L)
into D–R equal parts: 
RD
LRRb
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)()( 
Let us assume that our worker has a log-linear utility function: annual consumption yields 
utility log(1 – τ) and labor disutility is ξ, i.e. her annual utility while working is equal to log(1–
τ) – ξ. We assume that when the person is out work but not yet retired, she receives a modest
social aid a and has the same disutility ξ as a worker has (moral disutility is equal to physical
disutility). Then the discounted lifetime utility function (with discount factor δ) is given by 
U[R] = φ (R – L) [log (1 – τ) – ξ] + (1 – φ)(R – L) [log a – ξ] + δ(D – R)log b(R).
Inserting the NDC-formula into the utility function, yields
U(R) = φ (R – L) [log (1 – τ) – ξ] + (1 – φ)(R – L) [log a – ξ] 
+ δ (D – R)[log τ+ log φ + log (R – L)–log (D – R)].
The optimal retirement age is determined by the first-order stationarity condition:
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0 = U’(R) = φ [log (1 – τ) – ξ] + (1–φ) [log a – ξ] 
– δ[log τ+ log φ + log (R – L) – log (D – R)] + 
LR
RD

 )(
.
There is no explicit solution R(φ) to this equation but the character of the dependence of the
optimal retirement age on the non-fragmentation rate can be determined. Indeed, denoting
U’(R) by  V(φ, R),  we shall  rely on the theorem on the implicit  function:  R’(φ) = –V’φ  (φ,
R)/V’R (φ, R). Use the second-order condition V’R (φ, R) < 0 and V’φ (φ, R) = log (1–τ) – ξ –
log a +ξ – δ/φ. Then R’(φ) > 0 if and only if 0 <V’φ (φ, R). Since  a < 1–τ, φ > δ /[log (1–τ) –
log a] must hold.  To have a nonempty interval for φ,  even if δ =1, a < (1 – τ) e is to hold,
where e ≈2,718… is the base of natural logarithm. 
For example, for τ =0.2, a = 0.2 and δ =1, we have an increasing function R(φ) in the interval
(0.72,  1).  According to Table A.2, as the fragmentation 1– φ increases from 0 to 0.2, the
optimal  retirement age drops from 62.9 to 62.1 year,  and the corresponding contribution
length also drops from 42.6 to 33.7 years.
Table A.2
 Fragmentation, optimal retirement age and contribution length
Non-fragmentation rate Optimal retirement age 
(year)
Contribution length (year)
  1.0   62.9 42.6 
  0.9   62.3 38.1 
  0.8   62.1 33.7  
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